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ABSTRACT

Exploratory research suggests that denominational preferences, fundamentalism, and church attendance are related to an individual's position on political issues. A review of research reveals that religious beliefs are stable, developed early in life, and are central to an individual's other orientations. Research on religious orientation is limited because the paradigms which guide most political science research exclude the influence of religious beliefs. Also, the inclusion of religious variables poses conceptualization and measurement problems. However, an analysis of political beliefs by religious denomination taken from the General Social Surveys (1972-1980) suggests the importance of establishing such measures. Over 11,000 responses were categorized according to Catholic, Jew, 14 Protestant denominations, and no affiliation. Opinions on abortion, women's roles, pornography, sex education, busing, blacks, death penalty, and other current issues were measured according to conservative or liberal stance. Opinion homogeneity was great; for example, nearly 94 percent of Mormons opposed busing while 95 percent of Jews favored gun registration. Further, an analysis of the American National Election Survey (1980) reveals that categorizing an individual as fundamentalist may be more revealing of political attitudes than denomination. (KC)

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RELIGIOUS BELIEF AND PRACTICE: NEW FORCES IN AMERICAN POLITICS?

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RELIGIOUS BELIEF AND PRACTICE: NEW FORCES IN AMERICAN POLITICS?

Introduction

Although Gerhard Lenski called to social scientists to incorporate the study of "the consequences of religious belief and practice in the everyday life of society" (1963:vii) in the early 1960s, political scientists have been reluctant to lend more than cursory attention to religion as a variable important to political orientations. The omission of religion as a significant factor in political decision-making may be less serious during times when the connections between religious affiliation and beliefs and political issues and attitudes are subtle and poorly defined. But it is increasingly clear that subtlety does not characterize the contemporary religion/politics connection. Particularly in evangelical Christian circles, the connections are being drawn quite clearly for congregations and followers. Religious political action committees and groups are sponsoring and defeating candidates, making clear stands on issues, and doing battle to protest a threatened way of life that, in their minds, conforms to their most central values and to Biblical requirements. Thus to ignore the potential of religious affiliation and belief as key elements in the political decision-making process ---indeed, for some, as key and central elements of the belief system that guides that process---seems naive and short-sighted.

We shall argue that the treatment of religion by political scientists has been adequate---in amount, in conceptualization, and in measurement. We present what we consider strong arguments for a research focus that includes religion: the early development and permanence of religious attachments and belief, the centrality of religious commitment, and the increasing salience of the political agenda to evangelical Christians. In addition, we explore some of the reasons for inattention by political scientists, which include several biases of researchers (indeed, of the discipline) as well as problems posed in the conceptualization

and measurement of religion. Finally, we explore with survey data the connections between religion and politics---connections which are in some cases quite strong and should be incorporated into models of political decision-making.

That religion is correlated with political orientations and behavior is certainly no surprise to political scientists. Religious denominational affiliation and attendance have long been linked to party identification (See, for example, Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee, 1954; Knoke, 1976; Nie, Verba and Petrocik, 1979)[1]; to public policy making (Fairbanks, 1977; Morgan and Meier, 1980); to political tolerance (Stouffer, 1954; Nunn, Crockett and Williams, 1978; Pierson, Sullivan and Marcus, 1980; Beatty and Walter, 1982); and to vote choice and turnout (See, for example, Pomper, 1975; Erikson, Luttbeg and Tedin, 1980). All of these sources note correlations between religion and political orientations. But the ranks of those who do not explore the religion/politics connection are far more swollen than are those who do.[2] And even the sources mentioned above, in general, suffer from common flaws: 1) the impact of religion is mentioned only in passing---it is reported, not explored; 2) the magnitude of the relationship is almost certainly underestimated due to poor conceptualization and measurement.

The Case for Religion as a Variable in Political Analysis

That religion has been extended only cursory attention by political analysts seems particularly inappropriate in light of several fairly obvious characteristics of religious beliefs. We now develop those points, arguing that all signs point to the consideration of religion as an important factor in political belief systems. First, substantial evidence shows that religion, like party identification, is a relatively permanent attitude developed early in life. Second, religious beliefs form the basis for a world view, useful in dealing not only with personal problems (grief, for example) but also in the consideration of social and political problems. Values, for example, are related to religious beliefs.

And, finally, despite what some have labelled the increased secularization of American society, the contemporary political agenda has made the religion and politics connection increasingly salient, especially in light of the open participation of religious groups (like the Moral Majority and the Christian Crusade) in partisan politics. A new wave of political activism has become apparent among those holding evangelical or fundamentalist beliefs.

The permanence of religious belief is not, in itself, an indicator of a religion/politics connection. But in a strong sense, it is a precondition to the attachment of importance to the connection. If, for example, individuals change their religious affiliations or beliefs with some frequency, it is plausible that religious affiliation reflects political beliefs rather than the opposite. But, as Newport (1979: 549) states:

> It is clear that we do not live in a nation of sects with voluntary membership produced by conscious, within generation changes. We live instead in a nation of church-like religious groupings in which membership is largely a between-generational hand-me-down, produced from within.

Most studies of interdenominational switching show that: 1) there is little interdenominational switching; estimates of religious mobility range from about fifteen to 35 percent (Newport, 1979); 2) most switching occurs within broad categories, so that those who switch tend to remain in, for example, the liberal Protestant category even though their specific denomination may change (Stark and Glock, 1968: 196-198).[3] Thus, religious beliefs can be considered fixed beliefs that rarely vary. The message here is that religion is a central, stable attitude, and as such might be key to the development of political attitudes.

In many ways religious attitudes and affiliations seem to develop in a process similar to the acquisition of party identification. Children acquire religious orientations early in life. As Greeley (Marty, Rosenberg and Greeley, 1968: 156) notes, "We may not be born Protestants, Catholics, Jews, or humanists, but it is a fair bet that we have become one of these before the first day we set foot

in a classroom." The early development of religious preference is not limited to the acquisition of denominational preference. Smidt (1980: 25-40), reporting the results from a study of 825 elementary school children, notes that children develop "civil religious beliefs" during childhood as a result of socialization processes that are systematic and non-random. Although Smidt deals with the development of civil religious attitudes and their impacts on general political orientations (trust, acquiescence to law, etc.) his work suggests "that these orientations may play an important role in structuring the later acquisitions of various political attitudes and behaviors" (p. 32). In addition, he looks back to Greenstein's work (1965: 56) noting that "the more important a political orientation is in the behavior of adults, the earlier it will be found to emerge in the learning of the child". Religious orientations and affiliations emerge early; they seem to merge with and guide some political beliefs early; and it is not unreasonable to assume that they play significant roles in the belief systems that guide political opinion.

We have argued that religious orientations are both stable and developed quite early in life. We will argue below that the contemporary political agenda makes the religion/politics connection more visible and more easily interpretable, particularly for religious fundamentalists, whom it calls to political action. But if religion is a central orientation, and it most surely is for many Americans, it should guide the political beliefs of the public whether or not religious leaders merge their causes with the political. As Koller and Retzer note (1980: 160): "...whether we are talking about the economy or social issues, orientation to how best to address the topics is ultimately grounded in ideology and faith". Lenski agrees and is critical of the social sciences for focusing on "political" or "economic man" without deference to the "whole man" who "usually finds it difficult to maintain consistently for any period of time the boundaries between politics, economics, religion, and family life" (1963: 343). He points out:

> What is possible, what is probable, and what is inevitable in any secular organization is a function, in part of the characteristics of the individuals who staff them; and that in turn is a function, in part, of the socio-religious groups to which they belong. (343-344)

This centrality of religion to individual belief systems is widely noted in both the empirical and theoretical literature. Although that literature is too large and often tangential to our interests to review exhaustively, the work of Rokeach (1973) is instructive. He notes significant differences in value structures among different religious denominations and also between religious attenders and non-attenders. And the values that most distinguish Christians from Jews and non-believers are particularly important to more fundamentalist Christian groups (pp. 82-83). What is the importance of these value differences? They are "standards that guide ongoing activities and...general plans employed to resolve conflicts and to make decisions" (p. 12).

Thus religious beliefs are closely linked to values, which are key to all types of decision-making. But what of the charge that increasing secularism renders religious values less important to decision-making processes? Here, Inglehart's (1977) treatment of value change may be helpful. He argues that values in post-industrial society have changed and among those changes is decline in the legitimacy of religion (p. 4), along with movement away from traditional life styles. These changes have dictated new emphasis on "issues that derive more from differences in life-style than from economic needs" and have invited countertrends from those who hold dearly to the traditional ("materialist") values (p. 13). Religion might then be expected to play a key role in guiding reactions to societal value changes. It is therefore not surprising that conservative (evangelical or fundamentalist) religious groups have become active in a backlash movement in reaction to an altered political agenda. Lipset and Raab (1978: 392) explain the involvement of those with fundamentalist religious pref-

erences in political movements aimed at protecting their way of life:

> Fundamentalist religious belief, seen culturally in America, is also traditional religious belief. Traditional religious belief is the symbolic center of a traditional style of life. It is, among other things, "the cultural baggage" of that way of life. When drastic social change shifts the position of that way of life---and the position of those who bear it---traditional religious belief often becomes also the cultural baggage of the backlash political ideology that develops.

Religion, then, seems to play some role in the structuring of individual values. In addition, it may prompt social and political reactions when those values are threatened. Often those reactions come from religious liberals whose values may call for political change. But in a time when changing values cut at the heart of a way of life supported by religious conservatism, those religious conservatives come to action to defend their traditional life styles. As Greeley (Martin, Rosenberg and Greeley, 1968) notes, religion provides an "interpretive scheme" and a "meaning-giving system". As such, religious orientations seem certain to figure prominently in belief systems and to guide political decision-making.

A final argument for the consideration of religion as an important explanation for political attributes, is, in some ways, an expansion of Lipset and Raab's point (1978). We turn now to the increased salience of religion in the political realm. In particular, we explore a new presence in contemporary American politics: fundamentalist or evangelical leaders and adherents. Evangelicalism has traditionally stressed individual salvation through individual works and therefore its followers have been considered unlikely political activists. And, indeed, during the last 50 years, they "have remained..., with few exceptions, politically uninvolved" (Lorentzen; 1980: 144). In fact, during that period, religious activists have tended to be representative of liberal theology (lorentzen, 1980; Stark, et al., 1970). But the very visible participation of religious groups and ministers

in the politics of the late 1970s and early 1980s suggests that the posture of evangelical and fundamentalist adherents toward politics is changing. A study of supporters of an evangelical candidate in Virginia in 1978 indicates that although most of the supporters were inexperienced politically (Lorentzen, 1980; 152-3), they were called to activism in defense of the evangelical life style":

> The necessity of preserving the moral climate of America is, in effect, a means of preserving a life style, the evangelical life style. Much in the secular culture of America is at odds with the evangelical stance, especially the moral atmosphere and philosophies on which it is based.

In part, this is probably related to increased politicization of clergy. In a study of North Carolina ministers Koller and Retzer (1980: 158) find "no difference between conservatives and liberals (classifications based on doctrinal orthodoxy) in their propensity to address social issues" and that clergy in general are outspoken on social and political issues. They suggest "that concern for private man-God relationships (previously argued to stifle the political participation of the doctrinally orthodox by Stark, et al.) promotes interest in <u>particular types of public issues</u>" (p. 160). Thus, in contemporary politics there is among the doctrinally orthodox a perceived need to fight off immoral influences through political action:

> There appears to be an emphasis on nurturing the spiritual side of life by maintaining or creating a social order which enhances individual opportunity to lead a 'spiritually upright' and 'morally correct' existence (Koller and Retzer, 1980: 159-160).

Thus, although fundamentalist or orthodox religious beliefs traditionally may have suppressed political activism, they are related to all beliefs held by their adherents and can, in times when those beliefs appear threatened, emerge as both stimulants for political action and guides to issue and candidate choice.

In summary, we have reviewed three arguemnts for the consideration of religion as a basis for political beliefs. First, religious beliefs are stable and are developed early in life. Second, religious beliefs are central and related to

other central orientations. Finally, the contemporary political agenda is very relevant to the religious leanings of many Americans, particularly fundamentalist Protestants; its relevance has called previous political inactives into political service, and the connections between political beliefs and religious beliefs are being drawn quite clearly by religious leaders. But the test is in the pudding. We now turn to an examination of the relationships among political issue attitudes and several indicators of religion. Our measures are imperfect and our analysis is incomplete. But our findings underline the need to explore the relationship between religion and politics, both conceptually and empirically.

Why the deletion?

That religious orientation and affiliation have not been explored in greater depth as political variables is not terribly surprising in light of: 1) the paradigms which guide most political research; and 2) the difficulties of conceptualization and measurement posed by inclusion of religion variables. The paradigm problem is perhaps best explained by Warner (1979), who argues that sociologists have ignored the phenomenon of evangelicalism because of "class bias, liberal bias, and evolutionary bias" (p. 1). All three biases, according to Warner, are based in correlations that have been translated into identities: First, because religious denomination is associated with social status, social scientists assume that religion is defined by social status.[4] Second, because of the liberal orientation of most social scientists, the only interesting political activity of religious groups has been liberal protest movements. Since evangelical Christian groups have not been motivated to strive for political change and, in fact, have been characterized by political inactivity, their religious orientations have been assumed unimportant to their political beliefs (if they have political beliefs at all). And finally, secularism and a perceived (but not necessarily real) decline

in the importance of religion to society renders the notion that religion affects social institutions "passé". The result, according to Warner, has been the deletion of important theories and exploratory research, which might in turn defy these commonly accepted identities. There is, for example, a correlation between religious denomination and socioeconomic status, and evangelical denominations do seem to welcome the disinherited. On the other hand, middle and upper status evangelicals behave more like evangelicals than like those of similar status (See Lipset and Raab, 1978: 452, for example). And although religious liberals are assumed to be more political because of their visible participation in change-oriented movements, religious evangelicals hold to traditional morality and its concomitant political issues more vigorously than their liberal counterparts pursue social change (Warner, 1979: 6-7). Perhaps we fail to see the obvious and important because of our disciplinary blinders.

In addition, religion may be avoided as a focus in political science because of a more mundane but equally serious problem: Conceptualization and measurement. First, we face a serious problem of definition: what do we mean by religion? Or what aspects of religion are relevant to politics? And second, once we have grappled with the concept, how do we measure it? The answers are not easy ones, and, in fact, we shall deal primarily with the problems, leaving the answers to later efforts.

That the study of religion, in any context, poses problems of multidimensionality is well-recognized.[5] Dittes (1969: 606) notes, "The problem of definition is enhanced by the great variety of phenomena to which one culture or another applies the word 'religion'." One attempt to categorize the many definitional possibilities is that of Stark and Glock (1968), who suggest and develop five different dimensions: religious beliefs, practice, feeling, knowledge, and

effects. Each of these dimensions can be measured in a variety of ways. But in spite of the recognition of complexity of religion, social scientists and particularly political scientists have most often focused on the roughest of measurements of religion: denominational preference. Typically, that preference has been summarized by very broad categories---Protestants, Catholics, and Jews---or less frequently by slightly more descriptive categories which break Protestants into two or three categories.[6] Certainly most political analyses incorporating religion have focused primarily on these gross groupings, and, probably as a result, they have found relatively weak associations between religious preference and political leanings. A good example of this is the religion/party linkage, which always has been weak and in recent years has appeared through gross category analyses to be weakening. More recent work suggests that denominational preference has stronger effects on political attributes when breakdowns are far more precise (Beatty and Walter, 1982).

But denominational preference does not tell the entire story. Indeed many would argue that beliefs far outweigh affiliation in importance, and conceptual work in other social sciences reflects these concerns. One way to incorporate religious beliefs into the investigation of social and political attitudes is to classify denominations according to beliefs. Thus Glock and Stark (1966, Ch. 12) divide Protestants into Moderate and Conservative Protestants based on belief in the existence of the Devil and life after death. But here the problem seems obvious: religious beliefs vary even within single congregations and may vary enormously within a denomination. In addition, social scientists may be quite uncomfortable picking criteria for such classifications. An example might be a test of the hypothesis that religious fundamentalism is a characteristic pertinent to political opinion. Does one then try to decipher which denominations

fit that characterization, or does one look at the beliefs of individuals? The latter approach rarely has been used and yet seems, on its face, more solid.

Still a third approach to the conceptualization of religion is the use of church attendance as a summary variable. Dittes (1969: 611-612) reports that several factor analyses of numerous operationalizations of religion report a massive first factor in which church attendance is very prominent. Attendance has, on occasion, been utilized by political scientists and does show association with political variables (especially political tolerance---see Stouffer, 1955: 142; Nunn, et al., 1978, Ch. 8: Piereson et al., 1980.) But its relationship with the other religion variables currently used by political scientists is poorly understood. And there is some evidence that, for example, denominational preference and attendance have independent effects on some political attributes (Beatty and Walter, 1982).

The purpose of this discussion may appear to be to convince the reader that religion cannot be operationalized for political research. But, to the contrary, the point should be that operationalization creates some issues that we have not addressed adequately. Perhaps the message is that the impact of religion is almost certainly diluted and misunderstood by the use of gross categories---and that, at the least, multidimensionality should be an assumption when religion is a focus of investigation.

We now turn to the relationships between several measures of religion and political issues and ideology. Here our work is exploratory: does empirical evidence point to a need for building theories about religion and politics? We have argued that religious beliefs are learned early, are permanent and central, and are clearly relevant to the political agenda. If religion guides political beliefs, we should find relationships between religion and issue opinions. We

will deal first with religious denomination.[7] Largely because survey samples seldom include more than 1,500 persons, social scientists usually have categorized religious affiliation into four groupings: Catholics, Protestants, Jews and those with no church identity. In recent years some scholars (usually sociologists) have divided Protestants, generally on the basis of some notion of fundamentalism. Every social scientist realizes the dangers of collapsing potentially meaningful categories, and we have argued elsewhere that much information is lost by reducing Protestant churches to one or two groupings. Fortunately, the NORC's General Social Survey allows us to break out of the constraints imposed by a 1,500 person sample. The General Social Survey has been conducted eight times starting in 1972. Many of the survey's questions were asked in several years and a few, such as those on abortion, were asked in all eight surveys. By combining years, we were able to analyze the political beliefs within many religious denominations, even those which were quite small.

The religions for which we have adequate numbers of cases are listed in Table I. The N for each religion is that found in the combined surveys. When a question was asked in fewer than eight years these Ns, of course, decrease. In no case do any of the religions fall under 20 persons for those questions used in the paper. Note that we have also included those persons without a religion as a separate category.[8]

Although the General Social Survey was not designed to measure public opinion on a wide range of issues, several politically relevant items were included. Issues chosen for display (16 issues. See Appendix A) are ones over which there has been intense political dispute within the last decade. In addition ideological identification is included.

To determine whether or not religious categories were related to political

issues, analysis of variance techniques were employed. Relevant statistics are found in Table II. To facilitate the understanding of these figures variables were coded so that the position generally considered to be conservative is low, while liberal scores are high. Thus for the abortion index a low score indicates opposition to abortion, and a negative deviation represents a conservative position. The exact wording of the questions can be found in Appendix A. To make the presentation manageable only the three religions with the most conservative mean and the three with the most liberal means are listed. To make figures comparable across issues with differing numbers of categories the deviation for each religion was standardized as follows: $\frac{\text{Denomination mean-Total sample mean}}{\text{Standard Deviation for Total Sample}}$

All Fs are significant in Table II to at least .01 although it would be difficult to become very excited over the size of several of these measures of association given the large sample size. The F test coupled with the Eta, though, does indicate relationships of considerable importance for several of the issues. On abortion, women's role, pornography law, sex education in public schools, Blacks being too aggressive, gun control, and defense spending, a moderate relationship between denomination and issue is present. As was indicated earlier there is also a relationship between religious affiliation and social class. To control for this relationship income and education were entered as factors in the analysis of variance.[9] Table III presents the Fs and the Etas prior to and following control. Although there is a reduction in most of these statistics, the relationships are far from being reduced to insignificance.[10]

Perhaps of greater interest in Table II are the large differences one finds in the means for the most extreme religions. For instance, note the difference between Jehovah's Witnesses and Jews on the abortion and women's role issues, between the Mormons and those with no affiliation on the pornography law issue,

between the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Congregationalists on the sex education issue, between the Mormons and the Jews on gun control and between the Mormons and the Jehovah's Witnesses on defense spending. In terms of the ideological identification question we also find substantial differences. In particular members of the Church of Christ and the Mormons are a considerable distance from those professing no religion and the Jews while the Jehovah's Witnesses view themselves among the most liberal even though some of their group means do not match commonly held notions of liberalism. These are not insubstantial differences and the political scientist would do well to be aware of these challenges to consensus. In addition, the degree of opinion homogeneity among some of the religions is amazing. For example, on the sex education issue every Congregationalist interviewed was in favor of such education in the public schools. Nearly 94 percent of Mormons opposed busing, while 95 percent of Jews favored the obtaining of a permit from the police prior to buying a hand gun.

One other feature of Table II is important. Although there is a tendency for those in a denomination to be either politically liberal or conservative in the traditional sense, it is clear that some denominations do not follow this pattern. The best example is the Jehovah's Witnesses. They are the most conservative on such issues as abortion and women's role but they are the most liberal in opposition to increased defense spending and among the most liberal on welfare spending, gun control, the death penalty and busing. Seventh Day Adventists and Pentecostals follow a similar pattern. Because of their size one would not expect the Baptists to deviate much from the total mean; but on busing they are among the more liberal, while on the question of Blacks pushing themselves where they are not wanted the Baptists are among the three most conservative groups.

We are not arguing that membership in a religious organization leads inevitably to the adoption of the denomination's political positions. But given that reli-

gious denominations do vary in their dominant political attitudes and that these differences are not eliminated by SES controls, one must suspect that denominational influences are not insubstantial. It could be argued, of course, that liberals choose liberal religions and conservatives choose the fundamental ones. Undoubtedly movement of this type does occur but, as we noted earlier, most Americans do not change religions. They were brought up as Baptists or Mormons, and they remain in these faiths all their lives.

Within any large organization the degree to which the mambership adheres to a particular set of ideas varies. Particularly among Catholics and members of the main-line Protestant groups, there are many for whom religion means only a trip to church on Christmas Eve. In addition, although some religions may demand strict adherence to a set of guidelines, others are quite tolerant of divergent points of view. For example, Methodists, like Democrats, hold to widely varying beliefs. For these reasons denomination may not be a totally adequate measure of religious sentiment. Therefore, we examine a measure of fundamentalism taken from the NES/CPS American National Election Study, 1980. It is composed of two questions: 1) whether the respondent has been born again and 2) whether the respondent believes the Bible is the literal word of God. Some Protestant denominations traditionally have made "being born again" a prerequisite of membership and of late the term has been closely associated with churches considered to be fundamental. Patel, et.al. (1982) have shown that this characteristic is relevant to such political issues as ERA and Abortion. Dittes (1969: 613) points out that one of the features of the more conservative fundamentalist religions is strong emphasis on the literalism of scripture. Our fundamentalist index has three values: a one would indicate that the respondent was born again and believed that the Bible "is God's Work and all it says is true". A two means the respondent gave an affirmative response to one of

these statements while a three indicates the respondents were negative about both or were not asked the question because they did not consider religion to be an important part of their lives.

Unfortunately, there was not a great deal of overlap between the NORC questions and those of the 1980 election survey and, in addition, several of the issue questions asked in the 1980 study were not asked in the same survey as the fundamentalist questions. The analysis of variance for the fundamentalist index and seven issues and ideological identification is found in Tables 4 and 5.

The only substantial relationship in these tables is between the index and abortion. ERA has a highly significant F, but the Eta is not particularly impressive. Government maintenance of the standard of living is the only other variable that has a linear relationship with the fundamentalism index. Fundamentalism and ideological identification are significantly related but the strength of this relationship is hardly overpowering, and when SES measures are added the F test sinks to insignificance. One might suspect that since the abortion and ERA relationships are so similar to those found with the NORC denominational data that the two variables are redundant. We cannot fully determine whether or not this is the case because NORC does not have the fundamentalism questions and SRC does not have an adequate number of cases to examine political beliefs by denomination. However, the use of a more limited denominational variable allows us to test the redundancy of denomination and fundamentalism as they affect the abortion and ERA issues. Thirteen denominations had sufficient Ns for inclusion.[11] Both the denomination variable and the fundamentalism index were entered into the analysis of variance first without the SES measures and then with the SES measures included. In both cases the relationships remained significant (Table 6). Thus on these two issues fundamentalism is explaining more than denomination, although it is only on

the two most religiously bound issues of the last decade that we find a relationship at all.

As noted many social scientists have used church attendance as a measure of religious commitment (See Dittes, 1969). Although religious commitment need not be related to traditional values among American churches there is strong adherence to the dominant values of the past. We have shown elsewhere (Beatty and Walter, 1982) that religious attendance is related to intolerance of threats to the status-quo whether they be from the left or the right. Therefore the strongest relationships that appear in Tables 8 and 9 are not surprising. Those who go to church the most often are substantially more likely to view themselves as conservative, and this is reflected in responses to questions which tap resistance to the challenges of traditional morality. The abortion and women's role indices are significantly related but so also are the pornography and sex education variables. These relationships are not greatly reduced by the addition of SES controls. As can be seen from these tables other issues are significantly related to attendance also, but the Eta values are small.

Conclusion

The specific messages of our data analysis are not clear, although several conclusions seem justified by the data. First, denominational preference, fundamentalism, and attendance all are related to positions on some issues and denomination and attendance are related to ideological identification. For the most part, these relationships hold even when SES is held constant. Second, denomination appears to help some adherents to structure their political thinking in ways that depart from the traditional ideological continuum (The Jehovah's Witnesses are a good example.). Third, these data indicate that grouping Protestants into one or two categories masks important denominational differences.

But on a more general level, what does all of this mean? We argued earlier

that we expected to raise questions, not to provide answers. Our primary conclusion is that religion has clear relevance to political orientations---and that we have a long way to go before we can be very explicit about the relationship between the two realms. Thus, we conclude with a "to do" list in hopes that our study will provoke some conceptual and theoretical work by others. First, there is a clear need to develop clearer conceptualizations and measurement of religion. That conceptual work must develop measures that tap whether the religious impact on politics stems from leadership cues from ministers and religious leaders; from group affiliation and involvement; from religious beliefs; or from some combination of the above. This will involve experimenting with new measures of religion and also looking at interactions between and among different measures of religion. For example, perhaps we should look not at Methodists or Baptists but at fundamentalist and liberal Methodists or at fundamentalist and liberal Baptists. Our data analysis suggests that the relationships among religious measures and political orientations are complex ones, and the measures now available to political scientists for further investigating those relationships are inadequate. This is not to say we must start from scratch in developing measures for religious beliefs and practice. We might start by looking to work in other fields (particularly sociology) that explores religious orientations in greater detail.

Second on our list is a need to investigate the links between socioeconomic status and religion as they affect religious beliefs. We have limited our investigation to the imposition of controls for SES. Religion seems to have an impact on political beliefs that reaches beyond the socioeconomic characteristics of survey respondents. But there is still the possibility that religion plays a larger role, for example, in structuring the political beliefs of the "disinherited" than for those who are higher on the socioeconomic ladder.

Finally, there is a need to carry this investigation into the theoretical realm. Our study is very exploratory. But another step should be the development of theories about how, why, and when religious practice and belief should be expected to affect political beliefs. Is there always a relationship between the two realms, or is the relationship only present when religious groups become very visibly active in politics? How should we expect religion to interact with other background variables?

In short, we've only just begun, and we have a long way to go. But the questions seem important, and the evidence suggests that the investigation will be fruitful. Certainly, it is long overdue.

TABLE I

DENOMINATIONS INCLUDED IN ANALYSIS 1972-1980 NORC SURVEYS

	N
Catholic	3049
Jewish	286
Baptist	2517
Methodists	1510
Lutheran	962
Presbyterian	572
Episcopal	322
Pentecostal	232
Church of Christ	155
Christian	132
Church of God	90
Congregational	99
United Church of Christ	84
Mormon	87
Jehovah Witness	67
Seventh Day Adventist	55
No Affiliation	824

TABLE II

RELATIONSHIP AMONG DENOMINATIONS AND SELECTED ISSUES

ISSUE	MOST CONSERVATIVE DENOMINATION	DEVIATION FROM MEAN	MOST LIBERAL DENOMINATIONS	DEVIATION FROM MEAN	F	ETA	N
ABORTION	Jehovah Witness	-1.02	Jewish	.76	75.5	.32	9264
	Pentecostal	-.61	None	.58			
	Church of God	-.47	Episcopal	.52			
WOMEN'S ROLE	Jehovah Witness	-.96	Jewish	.46	18.1	.23	5344
	Church of God	-.59	None	.45			
	Pentecostal	-.35	Congregational	.38			
PORNOGRAPHY LAWS	Mormon	-.45	None	.64	19.7	.21	6547
	Seventh Day Adventist	-.43	Jewish	.42			
	Church of Christ	-.37	Episcopal	.10			
SEX EDUCATION IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS	Jehovah Witness	-.82	Congregational	.50	9.4	.19	3855
	Mormon	-.67	Jewish	.35			
	Pentecostal	-.45	United Church of Christ	.27			
BUSING	Mormon	-.33	None	.21	5.0	.10	6425
	Congregational	-.15	Jehovah Witness	.13			
	Presbyterian	-.15	Baptist	.10			
BLACKS SHOULDN'T PUSH	Church of God	-.38	Jewish	.55	24.8	.22	5904
	Pentecostal	-.32	None	.55			
	Baptist	-.28	Episcopal	.20			
DEATH PENALTY	Mormon	-.26	Church of God	.39	7.79	.13	7490
	Christain	-.15	Jehovah Witness	.35			
	Lutheran	-.11	Seventh Day Adventist	.11			

TABLE II (Con't.)

ISSUE	MOST CONSERVATIVE DENOMINATION	DEVIATION FROM MEAN	MOST LIBERAL DENOMINATIONS	DEVIATION FROM MEAN	F	ETA	N
GUN CONTROL	Mormon	-.48	Jewish	.46	16.0	.17	7751
	Church of Christ	-.25	Catholic	.21			
	Seventh Day Adventist	-.21	Jehovah Witness	.19			
COURTS TOO LENIENT	Christian	-.17	Mormon	.10	2.2	.07	8083
	Church of Christ	-.11	United Church of Christ	.10			
	Lutheran	-.08	Baptist	.08			
GOVERNMENT SHOULD PROMOTE EQUALITY OF WEALTH	Mormon	-.69	Pentecostal	.27	3.6	.14	2593
	Christian	-.55	Baptist	.13			
	Presbyterian	-.31	United Church of Christ	.12			
WELFARE SPENDING	United Church of Christ	-.29	Jehovah Witness	.30	11.1	.13	9547
	Lutheran	-.18	Pentecostal	.27			
	Church of Christ	-.16	Seventh Day Adventist	.23			
ENVIRONMENTAL SPENDING	Mormon	-.28	None	.22	6.7	.11	9410
	Christian	-.27	Jewish	.22			
	Church of Christ	-.19	Jehovah Witness	.18			
HEALTH CARE SPENDING	Christian	-.21	Jewish	.31	5.3	.10	9607
	Methodist	-.15	None	.08			
	Presbyterian	-.14	Seventh Day Adventist	.06			
CRIME CONTROL SPENDING	None	-.20	Jewish	.15	3.0	.08	9452
	Mormon	-.19	Church of God	.10			
	Episcopal	-.10	Baptist	.03			
DEFENSE SPENDING	Mormon	-.39	Jehovah Witness	.78	19.0	.18	9300
	Church of God	-.26	Jewish	.43			
	Pentecostal	-.18	None	.41			

TABLE II (Con't.)

ISSUE	MOST CONSERVATIVE DENOMINATION	DEVIATION FROM MEAN	MOST LIBERAL DENOMINATIONS	DEVIATION FROM MEAN	F	ETA	N
IDEOLOGY	Church of Christ	-.30	None	.51	16.6	.18	8127
	Mormon	-.28	Jewish	.49			
	Presbyterian	-.19	Jehovah Witness	.26			

TABLE III

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DENOMINATION AND ISSUE--CONTROLLING FOR EDUCATION AND INCOME

ISSUE	F	CONTROL F	ETA	CONTROL ETA
Abortion	75.5	49.0	.32	.28
Women's Role	18.1	9.3	.23	.16
pornography	19.7	15.9	.21	.20
Sex Education	9.4	5.0	.19	.14
Busing	5.0	2.9	.10	.09
Blacks	24.8	9.8	.22	.17
Death Penalty	7.8	6.8	.13	.12
Gun Control	16.0	13.1	.17	.17
Courts	2.2	2.0	.07	.06
Equality	3.6	2.6	.14	.13
Welfare	11.1	6.6	.13	.10
Environmental	6.7	5.5	.11	.11
Health Care	5.3	5.0	.10	.10
Crime	3.0	3.0	.08	.07
Defense	19.0	14.9	.18	.16
Ideology	16.6	14.7	.18	.18

A significant interaction between education and denominations at .01.

TABLE IV

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FUNDAMENTALISM INDEX AND SELECTED ISSUES

ISSUE	HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW	F	ETA	N
ABORTION	-.71	-.03	.27	123.5	.39	1061
ERA	-.52	-.10	.21	34.2	.16	1342
BUSING	-.16	.31	.01	1.2[B]	.08	670
CIVIL RIGHT LEADERS SHOULDN'T PUSH	-.24	.25	.05	3.2[B]	.11	667
GOVERNMENT SHOULD MAINTAIN STANDARD OF LIVING	-.27	-.25	.14	8.01	.11	1318
DEFENSE SPENDING	-.17	.16	.04	3.4[B]	.07	969
GOVERNMENT HELP OF MINORITIES	-.06	.33	-.02	3.4[B]	.07	1358
IDEOLOGY	-.24	.05	.07	6.0	.10	762

B Insignificant at .01

TABLE V

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FUNDAMENTALISM INDEX AND ISSUES

CONTROLLING FOR EDUCATION AND INCOME

ISSUE	F	F AFTER CONTROL	ETA	ETA AFTER CONTROL
ABORTION	123.5	71.0	.39	.34
ERA	34.2	21.1[A]	.16	.18
BUSING	3.2	1.4[B]	.08	.06
CIVIL RIGHTS LEADERS	3.2[B]	3.1[B]	.11	.10
GOVERNMENT MAINTAIN STANDARD OF LIVING	8.03	2.0[AB]	.11	.06
DEFENSE SPENDING	3.4[B]	1.6[B]	.07	.06
GOVERNMENT HELP FOR MINORITIES	3.4[B]	2.5[B]	.07	.06
IDEOLOGY	6.0	3.7[B]	.10	.12

A significant interaction between education and fundamentalism at .01

B insignificant at .01

TABLE VI

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FUNDAMENTALISM, ABORTION AND ERA

CONTROLLING FOR DENOMINATION: EDUCATION AND INCOME

ISSUE	F PRIOR TO CONTROL		CONTROL FOR DENOMINATION		CONTROL FOR DENOMINATION EDUCATION AND INCOME	
	F	ETA				
ABORTION	123.5	.39	54.6	.30	32.3	.29
ERA	34.2	.16	14.0	.15	6.0	.12

TABLE VII

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CHURCH ATTENDANCE AND SELECTED ISSUES

	ONCE A WEEK OR MORE	SEVERAL TIMES A MONTH	ABOUT ONCE A MONTH	SEVERAL TIMES A YEAR	NEVER	F	ETA	N
ABORTION INDEX (NORC)	-.94	-.15	.21	.53	.77	384.3	.34	9523
WOMEN'S ROLE INDEX (NORC)	-.25	-.06	.07	.17	.17	30.00	.14	6016
LAW AGAINST Pornography (NORC)	-.22	-.06	.05	.11	.19	116.7	.24	7327
SEX EDUCATION IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS (NORC)	-.07	.00	.07	.05	.01	21.0	.13	4344
BUSING	-.02	.00	.01	-.01	.00	1.2	.02	8755
BLACKS TOO SHOULDN'T PUSH (NORC)	-.03	-.07	.02	-.01	.12	5.6	.05	7898
DEATH PENALTY (NORC)	.01	.03	.01	-.03	.01	5.2	.05	8421
GUN CONTROL (NORC)	.03	.00	.01	-.02	-.02	5.6	.04	10305
COURTS TOO LENIENT	.01	.01	.01	.00	-.02	1.9	.03	10494
EQUALITY OF WEALTH	-.21	.23	0.0	-.01	.21	5.1	.09	2907

TABLE VII (Con't.)

	ONCE A WEEK OR MORE	SEVERAL TIMES A MONTH	ABOUT ONCE A MONTH	SEVERAL TIMES A YEAR	NEVER	F	ETA	N
WELFARE SPENDING	-.06	.04	.00	.02	.05	7.5	.05	9970
ENVIRONMENTAL SPENDING	-.04	-.06	.03	.04	.06	11.7	.07	9821
HEALTH CARE SPENDING	-.04	.00	.01	.03	.06	8.2	.06	10030
CRIME CONTROL SPENDING	-.02	.00	-.02	.00	.03	2.4[B]	.03	9875
DEFENSE SPENDING	-.01	-.01	.00	.01	.11	7.10	.05	9719
IDEOLOGY	-.25	-.07	.06	.12	.29	45.7	.15	8502

B Relationship unsignificant at .01

TABLE VIII

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHURCH ATTENDANCE AND

SELECTED ISSUE CONTROLLING FOR EDUCATION AND INCOME

ISSUE	F	F AFTER CONTROL	ETA	ETA AFTER CONTROL
ABORTION	384.3	357.5[A]	.34	.35
WOMEN'S ROLE	30.0	33.5	.14	.14
PORNOGRAPHY LAW	116.7	118.3	.24	.24
SEX EDUCATION	21.0	19.3	.13	.13
BUSING	1.2	1.1[B]	..02	.02
BLACKS TOO AGRESSIVE	5.6	4.8[A]	.05	.05
DEATH PENALTY	5.1	4.1[A]	.05	.05
GUN CONTROL	5.5	4.7	.04	.04
COURTS	1.9	1.7[AB]	.03	.03
EQUALITY OF WEALTH	5.1	5.2	.09	.08
ENVIRONMENTAL SPENDING	11.7	12.9[AB]	.07	.07
WELFARE SPENDING	7.5	5.2[A]	.05	.05
HEALTH CARE	8.2	9.3	.06	.06
CRIME CONTROL	2.4	2.1[B]	.03	.03
DEFENSE SPENDING	7.1	9.5[A]	.05	.05
IDEOLOGY	45.7	43.4	.15	.15

A significant interaction between attendance and education at .01

B relationship insignificant at .01

Appendix A

NORC QUESTIONS

Abortion index: The Abortion Index was made up of the following questions: Please tell me whether or not you think it should be possible for a pregnant woman to obtain a legal abortion if:

a. There is a strong chance of serious defect in the baby.

b. She is married and does not want any more children.

c. The woman's own health is seriously endangered by the pregnancy.

d. The family has a very low income and cannot afford any more children.

e. She became pregnant as a result of a rape.

f. She is not married and does not want to marry the man.

Opposition to abortion is considered the conservative response.

Woman's role index: This index was made up of the following questions:

a. Do you agree or disagree with this statement? Women should take care of running their homes and leave running the country to men.

b. Do you approve or disapprove of a married woman earning money in business or industry if she has a husband capable of supporting her?

c. If your party nominated a woman for President, would you vote for her if she were qualified for the job?

d. Tell me if you agree or disagree with this statement: Most men are better suited for politics than are women.

A restrictive role was considered a conservative response.

Pornography Law: Which of these statements comes closest to your feelings about pornography?

a. There should be laws against the distribution of pornography whatever the age.

b. There should be laws against the distribution of pornography to persons under 18.

c. There should be no laws forbidding the distribution of pornography.

The first response was considered the most conservative.

Sex education in public schools: Would you be for or against sex education in the public schools?

Busing: In general, do you favor or oppose the busing of Black and White school children from one district to another?

An opposition answer was considered the conservative response.

Blacks shouldn't push: Blacks shouldn't push themselves where they're not wanted.

An affirmative answer was considered to be the conservative response.

Death penalty: Do you favor or oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder?

A favorable response was judged to be the conservative one.

Gun control: Would you favor or oppose a law which would require a person to obtain a police permit before he or she could buy a gun?

Those opposing the law were considered conservative.

Courts too lenient: In general, do you think the courts in this area deal too harshly or not harshly enough with criminals?

Those believing the courts do not deal harshly enough were felt to be conservative.

Government should promote equality of wealth: Some people think the income differences between the rich and the poor ought to be reduced, perhaps by raising the taxes on wealthy families or by giving income assistance to the poor. Others think that the government should not concern itself with reducing this income difference between the rich and the poor.

Those against reducing the difference are considered conservative.

Spending questions: We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount.

a. Welfare.

b. Improving and protecting the environment.

c. Improving and protecting the nation's health.

d. Halting the rising crime rate.

e. The military, armaments and defense.

We felt conservatives would oppose greater spending on the first three but favor spending on crime and defense.

Ideology: We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. I'm going to show you a seven-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal to extremely conservative.

NES/CPS QUESTIONS

Abortion: There has been some discussion about abortion during recent years. Which one of the opinions on this page best agrees with your view?

a. By law, abortion should never be permitted.

b. The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, incest or when the woman's life is in danger.

d. The law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape, incest or danger to woman's life, but only after the need for the abortion has been clearly established.

e. By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of personal choice.

The first response was considered the most conservative.

ERA: Do you approve or disapprove of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment to the Constitution, sometimes called the ERA amendment?

Disapproval was considered the conservative response.

Civil rights leaders shouldn't push: Some say that civil rights people have been trying to push too fast. Others feel they haven't pushed fast enough. How about you: Do you think that civil rights leaders are trying to push too fast, are going too slowly, or are they moving at about the right speed.

Those believing that civil rights leaders are pushing too fast were considered conservative.

Government should maintain the standard of living: Some people feel the government in Washington should see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living. Others think the government should just let each person get ahead on his own.

Getting ahead on one's own was judged to be the conservative response.

Defense spending: Some people believe that we should spend much less money for defense. Suppose these people are at one end of the scale at point number 1. Others feel that defense spending should be greatly increased. Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this?

Greater spending was considered the conservative response.

Government help of minorities: Some people feel that the government in Washington should make every effort to improve the social and economic positions of blacks and other minority groups, even if it means giving them preferential treatment. Others feel that the government should not make any special effort to help minorities because they should help themselves.

The conservative response was judged to be letting minority groups help themselves.

Footnotes

1 For a good review of this literature, see Wilson (1978, Ch. 16). It has been argued that the impact of religion on party identification has, in fact, diminished in recent years (Pierce, Beatty and Hagner, 1982: 248-9), although that diminution does not translate into a weaker impact on issue and candidate evaluations.

2 Suffice it to say that none of the major texts on public opinion and voting behavior devotes a chapter to religion.

3 While Stark and Glock found 40 percent of American Protestants in specific denominations other than their fathers', approximately 80 percent of liberal Protestants, moderate Protestants and conservative Protestants had fathers of the same general preference. Those who did move out of a general category tended to move into either the no preference category or a more liberal category.

4 In particular, evangelical religious groups are defined by their lower class status.

5 See Dittes (1969: 606-627) for a good review of this literature.

6 For example, Lenski (1963), Nie, et.al. (1979), and Converse all divide Protestants into Southern and Northern Protestants. Glock and Stark (1966, Ch. 12) classify denominations as Moderate Protestants or Conservative Protestants.

7 There is, of course, the danger that the relationships between denomination and various political issues have changed during the past decade and it would, therefore, be incorrect to combine the various surveys. We found, though,

that at least for the major denominations changes have been across the entire population and not unique to any one particular religion. The reader should be aware, however, that we could not make such a determination for the smaller denominations.

8 Persons not falling into the categories presented in Table I were not included in the analysis. A combined category of "other" would, we believe, be quite meaningless.

9 Both income and education were divided into three relatively equal groupings.

10 Significant interaction is noted in each of the tables. Interaction is not discussed because the objective of this paper was to determine whether or not various measures of religion were related to political issues. Our approach is the conservative one in that ignoring interaction makes it more difficult to reject the null hypothesis of no relationship. If anything some of the relationships are stronger than the statistics indicate.

11 Religions included in the SRC religious denomination variable were: Catholics, Presbyterians, Lutherans, Episcopalians, Methodists, Southern Baptists, Baptists, Christians, Pentecostals, the Church of Christ, Mormons, Jews and those professing no affiliation.

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